Showdown in Sacramento

California is poised to extend its leadership on climate change as a pair of sweeping bills seek passage this week. Supported by Governor Jerry Brown, both bills passed the state senate in June, but passage by the Assembly looks like a close call as the bills advance to a vote as early as this Tuesday. Legislators are well aware that climate activists all over the world are watching them, and the Assembly's action will massively shape the message Governor Brown hopes to bring to Paris in December.

How sweeping are these measures? One requires the state to reduce all greenhouse emissions by 80% over 1990 levels by 2050. Another mandates a 50% reduction in automotive emissions by 2030, and requires as well that 50% of the state's electrical production come from renewable sources. Together the bills would mandate a seismic shift in California's energy systems, with changes in automotive habits and technologies happening with uncomfortable speed in this particularly auto-dependent culture. The changes required by these mandates are epochal, and would set a high bar for the rest of the world in the run-up to Paris.

How will these mandates be achieved? That's the sticking point--the bills don't say, and this gap has given force to a massive lobbying campaign by automotive and petroleum interests. Legislators say they are reluctant to vote for a bill whose enforcement provisions are unspecified, and who can blame them? Meanwhile authors of the bills are working to fill in some of the gaps with amendments that at least rule out measures such as gas rationing and fines for overconsumption. The amendments are designed specifically to win over moderate Democrats to make a majority in the Assembly, and they may prevail. But larger questions remain about the strategy of sweeping mandates, with implementation to be decided later, i.e. by subsequent legislators.

But of course the whole UNFCCC process is built on the same model: nations are committing to goals, sweeping or otherwise, but not generally to modes of achieving them. The struggle in California in that sense mirrors the global one, where promises are only as good as the methods for achieving them. The maneuvering in the California Assembly, powered by interests largely opposed to any climate change measures, will be instructive as to how much of the detail can be mandated along with the goals. A lot hinges on what happens over the next several days in Sacramento.

China and Climate: Macro-Problems, Macro-Solutions

Dramatic convulsions in the Chinese equity markets, rippling through the world's exchanges, combined with currency instabilities, talk of a broader collapse of a Chinese 'bubble economy,' seisms in international commodity markets, and more ... It seems clear that the global economy is going through a turbulent transition as China's mega-economy heads for a 'correction,' a 'slow-down,' or maybe a complete bust. But how will any of these scenarios affect the move to transform global energy use and reduce carbon emissions?

It seems clear that the Great Recession of 2008-09 was the single most effective means yet to control carbon consumption, but alas, it's a painful, temporary, and ultimately counter-productive way to do it. China's annual GDP growth rate has halved to a 'mere' 6-7 %, but that's still a lot of increased energy use. And the effects of a Chinese downturn are multiple, even perverse, and not so easy to predict. For example:

• Chinese global leadership in production of solar panels could be affected, as narrow profit margins will be compromised by market uncertainties;
• China's slowed pace is already part of the steep drop in oil prices, which tends to delay oil exploration--good--but increase demand--very bad, with serious counter-incentives in electric auto development, for example;
• General instability as China adjusts to new conditions can only exact a cost in the climate diplomacy initiative begun last fall with Obama's visit to Beijing, as such niceties can be too expensive to maintain in times of crisis;
• Conversely, greenhouse gas emissions apparently flatlined in 2014, before the Chinese turbulence really took hold, after steep increases the previous year, with no apparent macro-economic drivers at all.

My own amateur's intuition is that the Chinese impacts are so large that we should expect major consequences from what looks to me like more than a natural 'correction'--but I wouldn't be foolhardy enough to predict what those will be. My larger impression is that these global macro-economic events are still holding the rest of us hostage, preempting more direct and rational interventions in the climate problem. In short, we need a new way to measure 'bottom line,' with carbon externalities factored in. That's a mandate bigger than the Paris conference's, but maybe the reviving of the EU carbon exchange, the expansion of China's carbon markets nationwide, not to mention California's big steps in the same direction, will both gain momentum and extend it in the charged atmosphere of the Paris negotiations.

Christiana Figueres: Quarterback, Cheerleader, Play-by-play Announcer

I began writing this blog to sort out for myself (and any readers who happened by) what I thought was a pretty arcane though mightily important business: the UN's FCCC process leading up to the Paris Climate conference (aka COP 21). Not that the Paris event itself lacked coverage, but the whole 25 year process from Rio to Kyoto, Dubai, Lima, and so on, with dozens of international bodies and jargon terms like the infamous INDCs... all this needed sorting out in my own mind, and possibly, I thought, in the minds of others.

Though the climate question has taken on a much bolder profile over these past 8 months--thank you, The Guardian, and many others--the process is still a little arcane, but much, much less so since the eminent science journalist Elizabeth Kolbert chose to outline it in the current issue of the New Yorker, while profiling the UN official, Christiana Figueres, who presides over the whole thing. Now, for anyone who is still wondering, the process of how we got from then to now is readily available, spelled out in useful detail in Kolbert's precise prose.

But the article still raises more questions than it answers, including The Big One: will this process succeed in averting the worst of the climate disaster? Much leads up to that question: the erratic progress of the 20 previous COPs including the failure at Copenhagen 6 years ago, and the dogged, indefatigable optimism Figueres brings to her role as interpreter, champion, and nudge. It becomes her task to send out cheery announcements as countries submit their individual proposals (INDCs), loaded as they may be with prevarication, inertia, and outright obfuscation. Her mantra:"I've never met a single human being who's motivated by bad news."

But bad news there is: many of the participating parties have chosen to dress up the status quo and submit it. Irregularities of measurement, loopholes for allowances, and a general tendency of governments to protect parochial interests have caused many observers to conclude that this round of agreements--even if the conference reaches them--will be far from adequate to keep within the somewhat artificial bound of 2 degrees C temperature rise, beyond which lie unknown but frightening perils. And no one can say how the wealthy nations will reach the $100 billion annual contribution that they promised to help poorer countries adapt and mitigate. Without some resolution of that question, the conference could end as badly as Copenhagen.

The one faint hope Kolbert cites is a general move toward a "progression clause," an agreement to meet regularly after this year--maybe every 5 years--to review progress and press for stricter greenhouse gas controls. Though this year's agreement will certainly not be good enough, an ongoing process to improve it might give us a fighting chance.

Still I have to think that Kolbert, whose warnings on the climate question went unheeded for many years, has slipped out of her mask of sympathetic neutrality at the end of what is otherwise an admiring, at times effusive profile. She reproduces a 'graph' Figueres sketches, with two lines: one a straight, rising diagonal, showing the unbroken growth of the world economy. Midway sits a dot--the present--and from that point an ellipse bloops downward toward '0': that's the arc of diminishing greenhouse gas emissions. In its childish simplicity the graph sits on the page like a stinging rebuke to all simplistic, childlike optimists. And indeed, through her tears, Figueres backs it up with a ringing injunction against failure: "We just can't let that happen."

Maybe the against-all-odds positivism of Christiana Figueres is necessary to her as she performs her formidable task of keeping up COP 21's momentum. Maybe hers is the only attitude we can take to this conference and stay sane. I frankly admire her devotion, her preternatural energy, her faith. But the numbers don't lie--they have to change, the wishful curve has to get real. Someone--not Christiana Figureres, but someone--needs to say so to the Paris delegates.

The Turkish Conundrum

Of the many tensions that bedevil the climate change movement, one of the thorniest involves the rapidly developing economies--the ones just below the level of the OECD. These latter countries, notably the US and the EU, for the most part peaked in their greenhouse emissions around the 2008 global recession, and have remained below that level for various reasons: their economies have never fully recovered, their carbon reduction strategies, including fracking for natural gas, have continued to expand, and they have exported whole sectors of energy-intensive manufacturing, replacing these carboniferous jobs with cleaner hi-tech ones. It becomes easier for the US or Europe to promise increasing reductions when these are happening anyway, while the challenge to rein in the emissions of expansive economies in China, India, or Brazil is of a wholly other order.

Turkey, for example. Ranked 18th among the world's nations in GDP--if Turkey had been admitted to the EU, it would be its 6th largest economy--Turkey's growth over several decades has been rapid and continuous, an engine for growth throughout central Asia and beyond. But as The Guardian noted in a detailed article a few days ago, Turkey's expansion is largely fueled by coal, and will be for the foreseeable future. It has 80 new coal-fired power plants in the planning stages, including the world's largest, now under construction at Afsin-Elbistan. Unlike most other Turkish power plants, which run on imported gas or coal, Afsin-Elbistan will burn locally produced--and particularly noxious--lignite coal, despite protests grounded in public health concerns.

What sense does this make? Turkey has an abundance of solar and wind potential, but plans to draw only 5% of its power from solar over the next decade. Wind and geothermal projects exist, but Turkey's emphasis has been to increase capacity, regardless of source, to maintain growth. In 2009 Turkey requested and received an exemption from filing alternative energy goals, even non-binding ones, with the UNFCCC at Copenhagen. To date it has not presented a voluntary INDC plan for Paris, but has issued statements emphasizing the 'differentiated' nature of national obligations--i.e., newly arrived players like Turkey claim reduced obligations, on the (not unreasonable) grounds that they have historically contributed much less to the atmospheric problem.

So we can agree: nations like Turkey (and India and China in particular, and the whole developing world in principle) bear less responsibility, and have greater needs to expand their energy sectors, than the 'old money' nations such as ours. And Turkey in particular is not going to be pushed.  On the other hand, as The Guardian makes clear, health concerns alone should raise doubts about a coal-based strategy. Furthermore, Turkey--which will chair a G20 meeting later this year, just before Paris--wants to be understood as a regional power and a distinguished citizen of the global republic. Isn't there some way these converging interests--public health, climate, sovereignty (as alternative sources are inherently national), and diplomacy--enough to divert Turkey's myopic coal policy?

The rather detailed Climate Action plan Turkey published in 2011 seems to recognize these realities--both the magnitude of its challenges and the need to address them, for reasons both national and international, but still the plan starts by citing Turkey's "special circumstances." That phrase seems to allude to the young and burgeoning Turkish population, the urgency to continue economic expansion, and its dangerous dependence on foreign energy--mainly Russian gas. But the report also notes Turkey's renewable potential--wind, solar, and geo-thermal. What's missing is the financial link: Turkey has made clear its need for global financing, for example from the Green Climate Fund, to realize its alternative energy potential. In that sense, is the proposed expansion of coal-fired energy something of a threat, a bluff even? Could Turkey be led by international finance toward a more responsible energy plan?

Unwinding the complexities of this situation may be the most important challenge in the whole UNFCCC process. Domestic politics in the US or China or India loom large, but the expansive, explosive reality of emissions from rapidly growing but underdeveloped economies may pose both the greatest threat and the greatest opportunity for solutions. One can only hope that negotiations on this front are happening right now, so that Turkey's plan for Paris offers some concrete progress. Otherwise our future may be as dark as that lignite smoke belching from smokestacks all over Anatolia.

Obama's Climate Blitz (2)

When I posted two days ago about the President's climate plan, formally announced on Monday, I hadn't fully surveyed the massive press response. Reading through sources as disparate as the Financial Times and the NY Times' Dot Earth blog, I find near-unanimous agreement (apart from vituperative Republicans and other crazies) that something consequential has happened. But what exactly? Consensus seems to hold that:

1) it's a good plan, but not good enough: Climate Action Tracker, for example, still puts the US effort at 'medium' (below 'sufficient'), and suggests that the US engagement, applied globally, would lead to temperature increases well over the 2C goal;

2) however, the gesture of intensifying the goals in this final draft, coupled with Obama's notable diplomatic initiatives, has been perceived internationally as a major change of direction in US policy, and this sends a critically important signal to the Paris conference respecting the intentions of the world's largest economy. As Thoriq Ibrahim of the Maldives Islands puts it: "We have already seen the Obama Administration step up their climate diplomacy this year and I can tell you it has been most appreciated by the international community." 

3) There is widespread appreciation for how the Obama roll-out has strengthened the position of Hillary Clinton (or any of the other Democrats) for the 2016 election. Together, the President and the Candidate have defined the issue and staked out a position it will be hard for Republicans to challenge--but impossible for them to endorse.

What the plan does NOT accomplish--as the host French government reminds us today in this aide memoire for the December conference--is to advance the question of financing for developing countries. For Paris to succeed, the wealthy nations, led by the US, need to show how they will reach the promised $100 billion/year funding for the Green Climate Fund. Thus far, nothing from the US, though EU ministers are said to be meeting on the topic in October. Meanwhile, Joseph Stiglitz reminds us that at the Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa last month the US was on "the wrong side of history," as he puts it, supporting its multinational corporate friends in their efforts to fend off tax accountability in the developing countries where they operate. So while the US is bending the arc of its own energy policies in ways that will be important if they continue, its willingness to engage financially at the right level on the global stage are still lagging.

Obama's 4th Quarter Climate Blitz

How exciting is President Obama's new climate plan? One measure is all the excitement it is causing in Republican party circles: threats of lawsuits and non-compliance, warnings of energy shortages and higher prices, cries of 'illegal,' and even (from guess which soaring Republican presidential candidate?)  intimations of a Chinese Communist conspiracy. Clearly the plan must have some merit.

But is it really enough? The plan increases the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the utilities sector by 2% more than the previous version, a 32% reduction in all, by 2030--though this measures from 2005 levels and we're already 15% below those levels. So actually it proposes a rate of change that is rather gradual. One could compare that gradual approach with a report published today, supporting previous IPCC findings, that suggests we are far from achieving our threshold of 2C temperature increase, and can only get there by means of carbon capture technologies that do not yet exist.

The Obama plan conveniently federalizes the modes of reduction--no Big Brother showing up from Washington to tell your Governor what to do--though in the short term this admittedly clever and quintessentially American strategy opens the door to all sorts of resistance at the state level, while in the end the feds will surely need to step in anyway in the recalcitrant states. And it encourages carbon markets, which have already formed in California and New England, but are so far missing from candidate Clinton's plan, and (pace Pope Francis) will surely need to be part of the global solution. So this is a glass that is half-full but also half-empty, and any case not the big gulp the world needs.

But although the details matter, maybe the best way to look at Obama's achievement is by taking a step back. Measured against the tepid failure of carbon trading legislation in 2009, and the silence on this issue that reigned right through the first term, reelection campaign, and '3rd quarter' of Obama's presidency, his energetic espousal of the climate issue now looks seismic. Beginning with negotiations with China last fall, continuing through his diplomatic initiatives in India, Brazil, and around the world, embracing his determination to set a reasonable standard for the US INDC in Paris, and now taking on the worst elements of the coal lobby head-on, I think it's fair to say that Obama is stretching the art of the possible as far as it can go in this country, in this political climate, at this time. We could hope for more, a lot more, but I don't see how much more is possible without a new Congress, and new courts.

By calling the question in fairly bold strokes, Obama is furthermore setting the table for what will matter most: the US follow-through over the next several presidential terms, when the Paris agreements will either be met and steadily strengthened, or collapse in recrimination and catastrophe. Already the savvy Clinton campaign has figured out that climate change is a winning issue: more than 60% of voters support government action, and the entire Republican field, with one or two minor exceptions, is boxed into mindless, anti-scientific opposition. This change in public perception is of the greatest importance, as it allows Clinton (and other Democrats) to pursue intelligent policies and signals to the world that the days of US evasion may be ending. That shift in perception is a sine qua non for any meaningful agreement in Paris, and the President's actions, up and including yesterday's announcement, are making further progress possible. So happy birthday, Mr. President, welcome back to the fight, and thanks from all of us with whom you share the planet.